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INTRODUCTION

The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has taught the world many
invaluable lessons. One such lesson concerns the central importance of the
banking sector and its regulation for the stable and efficient functioning of
the global financial system-a subject matter considered too boring and
old-fashioned in the precrisis era of fascination with financial innovation in
capital markets and so-called disintermediation of banks. In the wake of the
crisis, policy-makers' attention, both domestically and globally, has been
directed primarily at correcting mistakes of the deregulatory precrisis
period and strengthening and recalibrating the regulatory and supervisory
framework for banks and other systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs). The crisis shattered the unfettered faith in the traditional notions of
market discipline, market rationality, industry self-regulation, and internal
risk management as sufficiently reliable mechanisms of market selfcorrection.' Accordingly, the explicit focus of postcrisis reforms on
macroprudential regulation reflects our collective realization that
safeguarding systemic financial stability requires a more assertive and
effective government oversight of individual banks' and other financial
institutions'
business operations. 2
But where does that leave banks' internal governance? Does firm
governance have any role as a mechanism of crisis prevention, or are
externally imposed regulation and supervision the only viable means of
achieving this goal? Scholars of corporate governance continue to grapple
with this question. Some of them advocate for corporate governance as a
more effective or market-friendly alternative to what they see as excessive
government intervention in private firms' affairs. 3 Others seek to adjust or
enhance some of the traditional corporate governance tools to aid, rather
1. Perhaps one of the most revealing moments in this respect came in October 2008, when the
former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Federal Reserve), Alan
Greenspan, publicly admitted that he had erred in putting too much faith in the self-correcting powers of
free markets. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html; see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 114-15

(2009) (arguing that rational profit-maximizing behavior of market actors produces negative
externalities that cannot be controlled without government regulation). For a more recent discussion,
see David Min, Understandingthe FailuresofMarket Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015).
2. For in-depth analyses of the postcrisis shift to macroprudential regulation, see Robert Hockett,
The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional 'Safety and Soundness' to Systematic 'Financial
Stability' in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2015), Gabriele Galati & Richhild
Moessner, MacroprudentialPolicy - A LiteratureReview (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper
No. 337, 2011), www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf, and INT'L MONETARY FUND, MACROPRUDENTIAL
POLICY: AN ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK (2011), www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/03141 la.pdf.

3. See, e.g., Valentina Bruno & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can
There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 461 (2010); Sean J. Griffith,
CorporateGovernance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2075 (2016).
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than supplant, regulatory efforts.4 The Dodd-Frank Act, the centerpiece of
the postcrisis reform legislation, mandates various measures aimed at
strengthening internal risk oversight at U.S. banks and other SIFIs.' In
passing the Act, Congress sought to broaden the responsibilities of the
boards of directors of such institutions, with an eye toward safeguarding
the long-term stability of the U.S. financial system. Regulators have voiced
the need to consider special bank governance measures as a tool of
postcrisis prudential regulation.6 And, across the board, there are calls for
improving the risk-taking culture at banks and other financial institutions.
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether, and to what extent, any such
newly enhanced corporate governance requirements would succeed in
changing banks' private profit-oriented culture and preventing excessive
accumulation of risk in the financial system. Part of the problem is the
sheer technical difficulty of managing systemic risk in today's dynamic and
complex financial markets. More fundamentally, however, the limited
utility of traditional corporate governance as a mechanism of systemic risk
management reflects deep-seated inadequacies in the conceptual and
normative apparatus of modern U.S. corporate law. Its prevailing notions
of what a corporation is, what goals it does or should legitimately pursue,
and whose interests its directors and managers do or should serve, are
simply not capacious enough to be able to incorporate a meaningful
emphasis on the interests of society as a whole.9 The dominant conception
of the corporate form as a contractually created vehicle for maximizing
shareholder value is inimical to the idea of making business corporationsor their directors and officers-agents of the broader public interest. To the
extent the private and public interests can be legitimately reconciled, it is
usually done at the periphery, in an attempt to find "win-win" solutions
that benefit both society and individual shareholders. Curbing excessive
executive compensation practices at systemically important banks, for
example, is one such area where regulatory objectives-and the public
interest they serve-are largely in line with the tenets of the corporate law
4.
(2010).

See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers'Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247

5.

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.

1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections ofthe U.S. Code).
6. See, e.g., William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014),
Tarullo,
K.
Daniel
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dudl41020a.html;
Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation
(June 9, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo2Ol4O6O9a.htm.
7.
See, e.g., Governance & Culture Reform: Archive, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/govemance-and-culture-reform/archive.html.
8. For a detailed discussion of why this is the case, see Robert C. Hockett, Are Bank Fiduciaries

Special?, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1071 (2017).
9.

See infra Part I.A.
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and theory.10 All too often, however, the incentives of bank managers and
shareholders to pursue short-term private gains are perfectly aligned but
work directly against the public interest in preserving long-term financial
stability." The recent financial crisis exposed how these socially
destructive dynamics operate in practice. 12 It also made abundantly clear
that the modem system of corporate governance, with its traditional focus
on solving specific principal-agent problems within a firm, is not a
sufficiently reliable or consistent mechanism for managing this insidious
and apparently pervasive conflict in a publicly beneficial way.
This Article accepts the existence of that built-in potential conflict as
the critical starting point for answering the central question of postcrisis
bank governance: How do we ensure that the board of directors of a
privately owned banking institution consistently and effectively acts in a
manner that serves the overarching public interest in safeguarding longterm systemic financial stability? The Article offers an unorthodox solution
to this problem: in lieu of "improving" or "tweaking" existing standards
and procedures that determine board composition or guide specific board
actions, it advocates a fundamental structural reconfiguration of bank
governance by giving the federal government a seat on the board of each
systemically important banking organization.
Specifically, the Article proposes a special "golden share" regime that
would grant direct but conditional management rights to a designated
government representative on the board of each affected institution.1 3 The
goal of the proposed regime would be to create a powerful organizational
node of public-interest-driven management, which would operate as a
dynamic and flexible internal "emergency brake" on individual banks'
activities presenting significant systemic stability concerns. To paraphrase
a staple metaphor, this mechanism would effectively enable the federal
government to accept the role of the "manager of last resort" of a
systemically significant financial firm-but only temporarily and well

10.

See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4.

11. See Hockett, supra note 8.
12.
For detailed analyses of market-wide and firm-specific dynamics that resulted in
unsustainable levels of risk and leverage in the financial system, see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES
OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC.pdf; S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 394 (2011),

http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/FinancialCrisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf;

FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,

THE TURNER REVIEw: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING

CRISIS (2009),

http://www.ecgi.org/tcgd/2009/FSATurnerReport-onFinancialCrisis_2009.pdf
13. The proposal advanced in this Article builds upon and elaborates the concept originally
formulated in Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a

Developmental FinanceState, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 167-74 (2015) [hereinafter Public Actors].
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before that firm's actions threaten to bring down the financial system.1 4
Importantly, the proposed golden share regime is neither a nationalization
measure nor an institutionalized bank bailout. Its overarching purpose is
not to put the federal government in charge of private firms but, on the
contrary, to steer the firms toward self-correcting and preventative actions
necessary to avoid that undesirable result. In effect, the golden share
regime would operationalize a novel approach to bank-and, more broadly,
SIFI-corporate governance as an inherently hybrid public-private
process.1

A proposal of this kind is bound to raise potentially significant issues
of legal doctrine and practical implementation. The present Article does not
purport to offer a full set of solutions to all of these problems; it merely
outlines in principle the key elements of the proposed regime's design and
operation. The proposal advocated here is essentially a thought experiment:
an attempt to push the boundaries of the familiar debate and to stimulate a
productive discussion of how public our privately owned banks and other
systemically significant financial institutions really are-and how publicminded their internal governance should be.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out a broad normative
justification for the golden share proposal. Parts II and IHl outline basic
substantive and operational features of the proposed regime. Part IV
addresses some of the key issues in connection with the institutional design
and administration of the proposed scheme.
I. RETHINKING THE PUBLIC'S ROLE IN BANK GOVERNANCE: TOWARD A
NEW PARADIGM

A. Bank Governance andFinancialStability: An Unresolved Tension
The term "corporate governance" generally refers to the system of
intrafirm structures and procedures through which shareholders and other
stakeholders in the firm exercise control over its management.16 In the
14.

The federal bank regulators, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),

already act as managers of last resort with respect to banks that are either insolvent or meet certain
statutory standards for so-called prompt corrective action. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2012). In that sense,
the proposal advanced here should not be seen as a truly radical departure from the existing practice.
Nevertheless, as discussed below, granting more flexible and direct internal-management rights to a
special public instrumentality that does not perform regulatory or supervisory functions and acts strictly
as a market actor would create a qualitatively new arena for systemic risk prevention and, in that sense,
constitute a radical departure from the current regime. See infra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.

15.

See infra Part IV.C.

16.

See Jens Hagendorff, Corporate Governance in Banking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

BANKING 139, 139 (Allen Berger et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015). According to one influential definition,
"[c]orporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which
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United States, where corporate law is a matter of state law, the model of
corporate governance focuses primarily on potential conflicts of interest
between equity holders, as residual claimants on the firm's assets, and
corporate managers and directors to whom they delegate the day-to-day
control over the firm's business affairs.17 In the academic literature, this
fundamental tension is generally referred to as the "agency problem," or a
problem of motivating the agents-who possess superior information and
decision-making authority-to act in the best interests of the principals.18
The agency problem remains the dominant analytic and normative focus of
mainstream U.S. corporate law scholarship and continues to dominate
academic and policy discussions on corporate governance. Critically, this
mainstream paradigm generally views shareholders as the only legitimate
category of principals in the corporate context and, accordingly, approaches
problems of corporate governance from a fundamentally shareholdercentric perspective.1 9 Among other things, it provides the basis for the
currently dominant claim that the sole legitimate corporate purpose is, and
should be, maximization of shareholder value.20
One of the key legal mechanisms for addressing the agency problem
and reducing shareholders' agency costs is the imposition of a special set of
fiduciary duties on corporate managers and, importantly, board members.
Under U.S. corporate law, the board of directors is charged with the crucial
task of managing and supervising the business and affairs of the
corporation.21 The dominant paradigm accordingly views fiduciary duties
as indispensable gap fillers in the fundamentally contractual relationship
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined." ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., G20/OECD
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/

download/2615 021e.pdfexpires=1488685295&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=58B3733B64C759
8CF12DOCOA72EB8FB8.
17. See, e.g., D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 174 (3d
ed. 2012) ("Many of the issues that arise under corporate law relate to conflicts between the board of

directors and the shareholders.").
18. The economic and legal literature on the essence of the agency problem and the significance
of minimizing "agency costs" in a corporate setting is simply too voluminous to cite here. For a
succinct overview of the agency problem as a subject of corporate law, see John Armour, Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIvE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d

ed. 2009).
19.
Once again, citing in a meaningful way an extensive body of literature proffering this
dominant (at least, in the Anglo-American context) shareholder-centric perspective on corporate
governance would be a futile task. For a compelling critique of the shareholder-centric view of a
modem corporation, see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012).
20.
For recent critical analyses of the "shareholder value maximization" paradigm, see id;
Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Special," Vestigial, or Visionary? What Bank Regulation
Tells Us About the Corporation-andVice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 453 (2016).
21. See SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 174 ("Officers ... are in charge of the day-to-day
operations of the corporation.... and they make many of the decisions that define a corporation's

activities.... [The board of d]irectors [is] elected by shareholders to supervise the officers.").
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between shareholders and their agents, which "essentially call on directors
to work hard and to promote the interests of shareholders above their
own."22
As fiduciaries, directors are subject to the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty and may be personally liable to the corporation's shareholders for
23
the damages caused by the breach of those duties. In general, directors are
required to exercise reasonable care, prudence, and diligence in managing
and supervising the corporation's affairs. However, the judicially
developed "business judgment rule" protects them from liability for bad
judgment calls, as long as directors followed reasonable due diligence
24
procedures. In most states, plaintiffs can sustain their burden of proof
only by showing that directors acted with gross negligence, a standard that
5
is much stricter than ordinary negligence. 2
These fundamental principles of corporate law and governance
generally apply to banking institutions that are typically organized as
corporations. At the same time, however, modern banks represent a very
special type of business corporation, which complicates straightforward
application of such principles in the banking context.
Thus, it has long been recognized, albeit not without controversy, that
26
deposit-taking banks are "special" even among financial institutions.
Banks are said to be special in that they perform certain important public
functions: they provide transactional accounts, operate payment systems,
27
and serve as channels for transmission of monetary policy. While each of
these functions can be, and often is, performed by various nonbank
institutions, banks have historically combined them in a way and on a scale
not evident outside the banking system, which led many to view banks as

22.

Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 FRBNY

ECON. POL'Y REv. 91, 93 (2003).
23. Id. Some scholars treat the duty of good faith as a separate and distinct form of fiduciary
duty. For the purposes of this Article, however, these and other doctrinal and theoretical nuances are
largely irrelevant.

24.

See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating a presumption that "in making

a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company").
See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director
25.

Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 186-87 (1995);
Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standardof Carefor Directorsand Officers of Federally
Chartered Depository Institutions. It's Gross Negligence Regardless of Whether Section 1821(k)
Preempts FederalCommon Law, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169, 191-93 (1994).
26. For a classic articulation of this argument, see E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in
(1983),
5
at
1982,
REPORT
ANNUAL
MINNEAPOLIS,
OF
BANK
RESERVE
FED.
Are
[hereinafter
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/frbminn/1982_frb_minneapolis.pdf
Banks Special?]; E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?: A Revisitation, REGION (Mar. 1, 2000),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/are-banks-special.
27 See Are Banks Special?, supra note 26. For a recent restatement of the argument, see Alan M.

White, Banks as Utilities, 90 TUL. L. REv. 1241 (2016).

1036

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 68:4:1029

quasi-public utilities.2 8 Furthermore, banks' traditional business model,
based on high leverage and large-scale maturity and liquidity
transformation, renders them inherently vulnerable to creditor runs.29 Banks
issue very little equity, their core assets are highly opaque, and their
liabilities are extremely short-term-a fragility-producing combination. In
order to protect banks from failure and to ensure their ability to continue
providing publicly important services, modem governments typically
subsidize banks by providing them with credit and liquidity support. Thus,
in the United States, the two central pillars of such support are the federal
deposit insurance system, administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and access to the Federal Reserve's liquidity backup
facilities.30
These "special" features of banks also shaped their internal corporate
governance. For example, American courts have a long history of holding
bank directors to a heightened standard of duty of care, by virtue of banks'
quasi-public functions.3 1 While many of these cases preceded the advent of
federal deposit insurance and even the widespread adoption of the general
incorporation statutes, the importance of holding bank directors to a higher
standard of care continues to be recognized to this day.32 In some states,
directors of state-chartered banks are subject to personal liability for
breaches of the duty of care if they are found to have acted with negligence,
as opposed to gross negligence. 33 Even self-professed supporters of the
currently dominant view of the corporation as a purely private "nexus of
contracts," whose primary purpose is maximization of shareholder value,
have advocated for expanding the scope of fiduciary duties of bank
directors to include a duty to ensure their bank's safety and soundness.34
Characteristically, the primary object of the heightened director duties
and responsibilities in all of these instances is the "safety and soundness"

28. See Are Banks Special?, supra note 26. While this canonical articulation of banks'
"specialness" identifies some of the key factors that explain the heightened public significance of
banks' core business activities, it nevertheless fails to capture the more fundamental relational dynamics
that render privately owned banks public agents in a more direct sense, as specially licensed de facto
"franchisees" of the sovereign. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
29. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, DepositInsurance, and Liquidity,
91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (analyzing the general dynamics of bank runs).
30.

See generally MICHAEL BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY (2016).

31.

See Patricia A. McCoy, A PoliticalEconomy of the Business Judgment Rule in Banking:

Implicationsfor CorporateLaw, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1996).
32.
See Hagendorff, supra note 16; PATRICIA A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL

§ 14.01,

14.04 (2013); Macey & O'Hara, supra note 22.
33. See BARR ET AL., supra note 30, at 813-14 (discussing the standard for bank director liability
under the New York banking statute); McCoy, supra note 32, § 14.04.
34. See, e.g., Macey & O'Hara, supra note 22, at 92 ("In particular, we call on bank directors to
take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions, or else face
personal liability for failure to do so.").
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of *the relevant banks. 5 The principal doctrinal adjustment, either as
sanctioned by courts or as proposed by academics, is to broaden the range
of the beneficiaries of bank directors' fiduciary duties to include not only
the banks' shareholders but the banks themselves-and, in certain limited
circumstances, the banks' depositors.36 By creating multiple new
beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties, however, this approach
potentially introduces a significant internal source of tension and conflict in
the operation of the fiduciary relation within a bank. Even more
importantly, this somewhat expanded version of fiduciary duties and
responsibilities of bank directors remains fundamentally tied to the familiar
notion of corporate governance as a mechanism of internal organizational
concern, a matter of "micro" rather than "macro" ordering. Any truly
systemic positive externalities of holding individual bank directors to
higher fiduciary standards are largely presumed to follow the first-order
effects on the individual banks' safety and soundness, frequently used as a
proxy for profitability.
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 exposed the dangers of precisely this
kind of over-reliance on microprudential tools for managing critical
system-wide risks. It laid bare the systemically harmful dynamics of
recursive collective action problems, whereby individually rational actions
38
by market participants led to a collectively disastrous result. To put it
simply, private market actors-firms or individuals, big or smallgenerally operate under strict profit-maximization constraints, which
renders them excessively susceptible to immediate pressures to avoid shortterm losses and to produce short-term competitive returns, even where
pursuing such strategies impairs their capacity to sustain long-term
profitability. Rationally responding to these pressures, individual firms and
investors tend to buy inflated assets during the euphoric bubble buildup and
sell them during the post-bubble downward price spiral, in both cases
exacerbating the destabilizing market-wide trend. 39 From this perspective,
declaring bank directors fiduciaries of the bank, as opposed to the bank's
35.
36.
37.

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id. at 98-102.
For an insightful analysis of the traditional concept of fiduciary duty as a status-derived

obligation of the agent to act as the principal's alter ego, thus eliminating the functional difference
between the two, see Hockett, supra note 8. As a conceptual matter, then, an agent cannot

simultaneously owe the same fiduciary obligation to several principals (or beneficiaries) whose interests
are not strictly identical. Introducing variations in the scope or intensity of fiduciary duty, depending on
the beneficiary's relative position or other circumstances, runs the risk of altering the nature of the
relation altogether.
38. Robert C. Hockett, Recursive Collective Actions Problems: The Structure ofProcyclicality in
Financialand Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies and Formally Similar Contexts, J. FIN. PERSP., July

2015, at 1.
39. See id.; see also Public Actors, supra note 13, at 122-37 (discussing the key differences in
the relative incentives, capacities, and roles of private and public market actors).
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shareholders, makes little practical difference. Even if directors faithfully
discharge their duty to act in the best interests of the relevant bank, a
private profit-maximizing entity, their actions can nevertheless exacerbate
socially destructive boom-and-bust cycles in the financial markets.40
In the postcrisis era, systemic financial stability came to be recognized
as the overarching policy goal that is explicitly separate from the goal of
preserving individual entities' safety and soundness. The Dodd-Frank Act
sought to strengthen the resilience of the U.S. financial system, among
other things, by mandating compliance with a range of new, or newly
enhanced, entity-wide risk-oversight responsibilities of the boards of
directors of banks, bank holding companies (BHCs), and other SIFIs. 4 1
However, the Act does not attempt to revisit the old underlying concept of
bank directors' fiduciary duties as a firm-level internal ordering device.42
With respect to financial firms that are not chartered as banks-including
BHCs organized as regular state-chartered corporations-a fundamental
reorientation of directors' fiduciary duties toward the broader public
interest in systemic stability presents an even bigger conceptual and
practical challenge. Accomplishing that task would require potentially far
more radical adjustments to the dominant corporate law and governance
paradigm than merely tightening certain regulatory compliance
requirements.
In recent years, a few legal scholars explored potential avenues for
making such adjustments. For instance, under one proposal, individual
firms would be required to appoint a critical mass of so-called public
directors who would act as representatives of the public interest on such
firms' boards.4 3 These public directors would be either publicly elected or
administratively appointed, and their principal function would be to
introduce an explicitly other-regarding perspective into corporate boards'
deliberations, thus making banks and other SIFIs more likely to behave in a

&

40. For an insightful recent discussion of the dynamics and history of financial asset booms and
busts, see ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 33-135 (2014).
41. For an overview of such board-duty-enhancing measures under the Dodd-Frank regime and
implementing regulations, see MCCOY, supra note 32, § 14.04; Edward D. Herlihy et al., Financial
Institutions Developments: Key Trends in Financial Institutions M&A and Governance, 52 BANK
CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 23 (2014).
42. One of the most controversial aspects of the postcrisis reforms in bank and SIFl governance
concerned the regulators' efforts to make such institutions' boards more directly responsible for the
effective functioning of their firms' risk management systems, which the industry perceived as a
dangerous and unworkable attempt to blur the line between directors' traditional oversight role and the
managers' executive role. See, e.g., DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, CLIENT UPDATE: BASEL COMMITTEE
2015 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/

insights/publications/2015/08/2015081 Ibasel committee_2015_corporategovernanceprinciples.pdf
43. See Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies ofBanking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 861
(2015); James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director:Countering CorporateInner Circles, 83

OR. L. REV. 435, 490-540 (2004).
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systemic-stability-enhancing manner.4 Yet, it is not entirely clear whether,
or why, these "public" directors would be more effective than today's
"independent" directors in counteracting "groupthink" or significantly
altering the systemically harmful shareholder-value-driven board
behavior.4 5 As long as nonpublic directors' fiduciary duties continue to be
interpreted as running to the firm's shareholders, the presence of public
directors is unlikely to resolve the underlying tension between microrationality and macro-stability.
Another intriguing proposal targets the substantive scope of directors'
46
fiduciary duties, rather than the composition of SIFIs' boards. Under this
approach, SIFI directors would owe a broader fiduciary duty of care
directly to the firm, rather than its shareholders, and be liable for failure to
control the firm's systemically risky behavior that results in significant
losses to that firm. 47 The proposal "revives the case for director-negligence
liability as a method of constraining bank risk-taking, not limited to cases
of bank failure but rather addressed to cases in which a large financial
institution suffers losses of a magnitude and kind that could threaten the
institution's stability."48 In effect, it seeks to align directors' interests with
the interests of SIFIs' diversified shareholders, likely to suffer greater
losses from systemic distress than from any individual firm's failure.
What makes this proposal particularly noteworthy is that, in an attempt
to push conceptual boundaries, it underscores the inherent inability of the
traditional corporate law and governance doctrine to accommodate the
postcrisis systemic risk perspective. However sophisticated, this proposal is
premised on a fundamentally questionable assumption that systemic harms
can, and should, be effectively policed by individual firms' shareholdersand on an ex post basis.4 9 Moreover, by conditioning directors' liability on

44. Allen, supra note 43, at 901-02. It is worth noting that Professor Fanto's original proposal
was not designed specifically to apply to financial institutions. See Fanto, supranote 43.

45.

For a discussion of the role and efficacy of independent directors on the boards of publicly

listed companies, see Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Independent DirectorModel Broken?, 37 SEATrLE U.

L. REv. 775 (2014).
46. See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL
ANALYsIS 35 (2014).
Armour and Gordon offer a compelling argument as to why traditional private law
47.
mechanisms, such as tort liability, simply do not do the job of forcing SIFIs to externalize systemic
harms caused by their activities. Id. at 37.

48.
49.

Id. at 64.
While targeting the ex post director liability regime, Armour and Gordon's proposal is

designed to force the board of directors to take a more active role in monitoring and preventing
potentially systemically harmful business strategies of the firm's management. Perhaps the fear of
personal liability and shareholder suits in the event such strategies cause the firm to sustain large losses
would, in fact, be a more "high-powered" director-oversight incentive than the threat of regulatory
sanctions. But, even if true, this proposition does not address the key issue of whether individual
directors serving on individual firms' boards are, in fact, capable of determining-on an ex ante basis-

precisely which business decisions are potentially systemically harmful and, therefore, should be vetoed
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significant losses to an individual SIFI, it erroneously conflates systemic
stability with "firm stability." While the emphasis on private enforcement
of directors' fiduciary duties through shareholder litigation clearly signals
the fundamental continuity of this proposal with traditional AngloAmerican corporate law, it also undermines its credibility as a potential
solution to the problem of systemic risk prevention.
To conclude, it appears that expanding bank directors' fiduciary duties
beyond their traditionally limited scope does not help to overcome the
inherently nonsystemic, entity-centric character of this and other tools of
corporate governance. At its core, fiduciary duty functions as a mechanism
for structuring and managing the relationship between directors (agents)
and those parties (principals or beneficiaries, shareholders or entire firms)
on whose behalf or for whose benefit they run the firm's business.50
Fiduciary duty is not designed to govern directly the firm's relationship
with, and behavior toward, the rest of the outside world: it generally affects
such external, outward-looking interactions only by implication, as a
consequence rather than an intended goal. Acknowledging this inherent
limitation of the fiduciary duty construct underscores the need to search for
alternative mechanisms of incorporating the goal of systemic stability into
the very fabric of banks' internal governance processes.5
B. Bank Governance as a Matter ofPublic Interest
As discussed above, banks have long been recognized as a "special"
group of private firms that are publicly subsidized, by virtue of their
supposed indispensability in ensuring smooth operation of the financial
system.52 More importantly, however, banks are also very "special" entities

in spite of their short-term profitability. Such determination, by its very definition, requires the relevant
decision makers to have a truly system-wide view and exercise their judgment on the basis of systemwide considerations-which gives public instrumentalities a critical built-in advantage over private
actors. See Public Actors, supra note 13.

50. See Hockett, supranote 8.
51. It is important to emphasize here that the preceding discussion focuses not on any specific
organizational or behavioral dynamics that tend to undermine corporate boards' efficacy, but on the
deep structural limitations of fiduciary duty as a potential tool of enhancing systemic financial stability.
Undoubtedly, overcoming groupthink and other well-known cognitive and organizational failures of
real-life corporate boards is an important element of improving the overall quality of corporate
governance. However, this Article's key point so far is that, even in the absence of such distortions, an
individual firm's directors are not properly positioned to act consistently and predominantly on behalf
of the public as a whole. It would be misguided to pin our collective hopes for a more stable financial
system on the prospect of maintaining such a perfect alignment of public and private interests in
financial markets. Making bank directors better educated, less prone to groupthink, and more willing to
question bank managers may make them better, more effective fiduciaries in a traditional sense, but it
would not somehow redirect their primary duty toward the general public. For a discussion of what it
might take to turn bank directors into official "public fiduciaries," see Hockett, supranote 8.
52.

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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in a deeper, constitutive sense: though organized as privately owned
53
corporations, banks are the quintessential public-private partnerships.
The government authorizes banks to perform vital public (i.e., sovereign)
functions-creation of money and allocation of credit-for private gain.
Thus, banking is not simply a private economic enterprise but a delegated
public policy responsibility, and banks are not simply private companies
but franchisees of the public, entrusted to aid in the continuous generation
54
and distribution of the sovereign public's full faith and credit.
A full elaboration of this view of banking-and finance, more
generally-as a public-private franchise is beyond the scope of this
Article.5 5 For present purposes, the key normative implication of reframing
banks' systemic function as that of a franchisee managing the flow of a
vital public resource is the recognition that the sovereign public, as the
franchisor, has an inherent right to control the terms on which that public
resource flows throughout the economy-and to do so not only as an
exogenous source of "command-and-control" regulation but as an
endogenous market actor. 5 6 Accordingly, this view recasts internal
corporate governance of banks and other financial firms as a matter of
direct concern to the government, in its capacity as the collective agent
representing the sovereign public. It creates the crucial intellectual space
for designing a novel regime of direct government participation in
banks'- and, broader, SIFIs'-internal management, specifically for the
purpose of avoiding socially harmful shocks to the financial system. It
explicitly imposes the burden of safeguarding the long-term public interest
in systemic stability on the party best equipped and motivated to bear itand to do so preemptively, from within the individual firm.
What specific form should this role take?
The sovereign franchisor, acting primarily through the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury Department, injects its full faith and credit into the
financial system to support and underwrite the massive flows of public and
private capital in a variety of forms and through a variety of channels. It
acts as the uniquely indispensable creditor, insurer, guarantor, and
counterparty in a myriad of transactions that together constitute the modern
financial market.57 While these actions of the government as a market actor

53.

For a full elaboration of this concept, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The

Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssm.com/abstract-2820176
[hereinafter The Finance Franchise); see also MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016), http://search.ebscohost.com.1ibdata.lib.ua.edu/login.aspx?direct-

true&db-nlebk&AN=l 180882&site=ehost-live&ebv-EB&ppid-pp_Cover.
54.

See The Finance Franchise,supra note 53.

55.

For a fully articulated argument, see id.

56.

See id.; see also PublicActors, supra note 13, at 164.
See The FinanceFranchise,supra note 53.

57.
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often remain hidden in plain view, they are readily visible and widely
acknowledged with respect to deposit-taking banks. An explicit federal
guarantee of banks' privately issued deposit liabilities, in particular, makes
it easy to see that, in the final analysis, the government-as a representative
of the American public-stands behind private financial firms' balance
sheets. In fact, an individual banking institution's entire balance sheet can
be viewed as "a thick bundle of contingent claims on the government."5 8
Thus, at least in the context of an insured bank, it is an incontrovertible fact
that the ultimate bearer of full residual risk of the bank's failure is the
federal government, rather than private shareholders shielded by limited
liability.5 9
This creates a puzzling inconsistency in our commonly accepted view
of the business world. Corporate law generally identifies stockholders'
equity with residual risk-bearing and accepts the intuitively just principle of
reserving voting and management rights in a particular enterprise to
shareholders most exposed to the risk of its failure. The intuition behind
this principle is that shareholders should be able to take preventative
measures lowering their risk of loss. However, the government-as the
bearer of the most residual risk of bank failure, including its systemic
consequences-does not have any such rights in privately owned banks.
Neither the difficulty of quantifying the magnitude of potential public loss
on a bank's balance sheet nor the general availability of regulatory
protections justifies this presumptive denial of the government's
entitlement to lower its risk through direct participation in the bank's
management, in accordance with the basic tenets of corporate law and
governance. 60 On the contrary, a conceptually coherent way to prevent
socialization of losses and privatization of gains in the banking sector
58.

See Anna Gelpern, Common Capital: A Thought Experiment in Cross-BorderResolution, 49

TEX. INT'L L.J. 355, 356 (2014). According to Gelpern,
Like the public-policy functions, government commitments permeate the bank balance
sheet. Central-bank liquidity support, deposit insurance, regulatory valuation of assets and
liabilities, and resolution procedures all represent government commitments that shape the
way in which a bank does business.
Other kinds of firms-hospitals, farming cooperatives, nuclear power plants, and
insurance companies-might deliver public goods, receive public support, be subject to
intrusive regulation, or all of the above. Banks are extreme in two ways. First, a bank's

balance sheet is its policy work, most plainly visible in the combination of demand deposits
(money issuance) and long-term loans (credit allocation). A hospital's financial structure is
at best indirectly relevant to its impact on public health. Second, the number of policy
functions and government commitments on a private bank's balance sheet is high compared
to just about any other enterprise. Governments direct, value, or underwrite virtually every
line of the bank balance sheet.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
59.
The same dynamics of support operate outside the realm of the formal banking system,
where the public subsidy takes on a more implicit form. See The FinanceFranchise, supranote 53.
60. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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would be to restore the natural connection between risk and control. 61 Since
it is unrealistic to expect private financial firms to internalize systemic risks
they pose,62 the only logical solution is to formalize the public's residualrisk-bearing role by granting it direct control rights in such firms.
Recognizing the public's de facto equity-like risk-bearing stake on
banks' balance sheets opens up new possibilities for preventing banks from
engaging in systemically risky behavior. Instead of trying to stretch the
limits of the existing corporate governance rules to solve systemic
problems they are not designed to solve, we can focus on creating more
effective mechanisms that would put on private firms' boards a public
instrumentality directly charged with protecting the public's interests. This
Article explores the possibility of establishing a special golden share
regime as one such alternative governance mechanism.
II. THE GOLDEN SHARE MECHANISM: SETTING THE STAGE

This Part begins outlining a general scheme for using the golden share
device as a tool for safeguarding long-term stability of the U.S. financial
system. Given its far-reaching effects on the rights and responsibilities of
principal stakeholders in financial firms, this new golden share mechanism
will have to be created by an act of the U.S. Congress. This Part outlines
the key substantive provisions of federal legislation, or the enabling statute,
that would accomplish that goal. The focus is on the nature, purposes,
jurisdictional scope, and basic "peacetime" operation of the proposed
63
regime.
A.

The Concept of a Golden Share. Background

In the context of government action, the term golden share denotes a
wide range of legal arrangements giving the government special, exclusive,
and nontransferable corporate-governance rights in privately owned
enterprises. It is an instrument "that gives the state a continuing power over
certain fundamental corporate decisions."6 Golden shares were widely
used in the 1980s during the global wave of privatizations of state-owned

61.
62.
63.

See Public Actors, supra note 13 at 164. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
See Armour & Gordon, supra note 46, at 44-64.
Parts II and III of this Article build and expand upon Public Actors, supra note 13, at 167-

74.
64.
Larry Cata Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders,
Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82

TuL. L. REv. 1801, 1806 n.12 (2008).
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companies.6 5 Governments used this mechanism to (1) ensure continuing
national, as opposed to foreign, control over privatized companies deemed
to be strategically important, especially in terms of the nation's military
and economic security, 6 6 or (2) minimize post-privatization disruptions of
basic social services.67 The key perceived benefit of the golden share
mechanism was its flexibility and malleability, which allowed for
company-specific adjustments.68 As a holder of the golden share, the
government could have disproportionate voting power with respect to the
election of the company's directors and various strategic decisions
affecting the operation of the company, including decisions to merge,
dispose of material assets, or enter or discontinue a particular line of
business. 69 In effect, the golden share enabled governments "to monitor the
ordinary commercial activity of a corporation." 70
This ability to affect directly a private firm's substantive business
decisions-without holding a controlling economic equity stake-is a
particularly promising feature of the golden share as a potential new
mechanism for preventing systemic financial shocks. The latest financial
crisis underscored the danger of overreliance on private financial
institutions' internal risk management and individually rational decisionmaking to ensure systemic stability. Formal regulatory oversight of
financial institutions' activities, at least in its current form, also has
significant limitations, especially given the pervasiveness of regulatory
arbitrage and the increasing complexity and opacity of financial products
and transactions.7 1 As market "outsiders," financial regulators perennially
65.
When Margaret Thatcher's conservative government privatized large and economically
significant British enterprises-including Britoil, Aerospace, British Telecom, and Jaguar-it retained a

golden share in each of these companies, which allowed the government to out-vote other shareholders.
Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance? Securitization of StateOwned Enterprises and New Forms of State Ownership, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1, 20-22 (1995).
Governments of France, Turkey, Israel, and post-communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe
followed the British example by reserving a variety of special corporate-governance and super-voting

rights in privatized firms. See id; Alice Pezard, The Golden Share ofPrivatizedCompanies, 21 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 85 (1995).
66.

See Pezard, supra note 65, at 86-87. Many European governments used their golden shares

to block foreign acquisitions of corporate control in strategically important domestic firms. In a series
of cases decided between 2000 and 2007, the European Court of Justice invalidated the use of the

golden share for such protectionist purposes as restricting the free movement of capital in violation of
the EU law. See Backer, supranote 64; Christine O'Grady Putek, Limited But Not Lost: A Comment on

the ECJ's Golden ShareDecisions, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2219 (2004).
67.

See Baev, supra note 65, at 36-38.

68.

See Stefan Grundmann & Florian M6slein, Golden Shares-State Control in Privatised

Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects, 2001 EuR. BANKING & FIN. L. J.

623.
69.
70.
71.

See Baev, supra note 65, at 23-27.
Id. at 27.
For a discussion of the role complexity plays in reducing the efficacy of the current

regulatory regime, see, for example, Saule T. Omarova, License To Deal: Mandatory Approval of
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lag behind private market participants in their ability to access and process
vital market information, and their ability to act is inherently limited by
various jurisdictional constraints.72 By contrast, giving the government a
direct equity stake with special management rights in financial-service
firms-that is, making the government a firm insider-would remove
many of these legal and informational obstacles. As a special shareholder
with uniquely tailored rights, the government would acquire the new
capacity to take speedy and effective action necessary to counteract
socially harmful, and thus irrational, effects of pure market rationality.
Without a doubt, the very idea of making the federal government a
direct equity owner in private financial firms is likely to attract familiar
criticisms as being too radical, unworkable, or even dangerous. Some of
these criticisms may be simply variations on the familiar themes in
reactionary rhetoric, so brilliantly described by Albert Hirschman.73 At the
same time, much like any innovative approach, this proposal poses a range
of legitimately complex questions of legal doctrine, administrative design,
and economic practicality. Without claiming to offer complete answers to
all of those questions, this Article outlines the general contours of how we
could potentially repurpose the golden share mechanism in order to ensure
systemic financial stability and minimize the likelihood of financial crises.
B. SGS Basics: Substantive Mandate; Key Definitions
The main operative provision of the federal statute establishing the new
regime will mandate issuance by each "covered entity" of a single share of
a special class-"state golden share" or "special government share" (in
either case, SGS)-to be beneficially and legally owned, exclusively and at
all times, by the federal government in its capacity as the "SGS Holder."
Statutory definitions of these terms form the basic operational framework
for the proposed scheme.
1.

Covered Entity

The definition of covered entity is essential to determining the
jurisdictional scope of the SGS regime. As a matter of regime design, the
initial choice is between (1) a broad base definition followed by specific
carve-outs for certain types of financial institutions, and (2) a narrow, more
Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 63 (2012). See also Dan Awrey, Complexity,
Innovation, and the RegulationofModern FinancialMarkets, 2 HARv. Bus. L. REv. 235 (2012).
72. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward FinancialIndustry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 411, 431-38 (2011).
See ALBERT 0. HiRsCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
73.
JEOPARDY 7 (1991).
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targeted definition, coupled with an explicit grant of regulatory discretion
to broaden it in certain circumstances.
Under the first option, the statute will define covered entity very
broadly, to include, for example, all financial institutions identified by their
regulatory status as FDIC-insured depository institutions, bank holding
companies, securities broker-dealers, and so on. To ensure that the
definition does not inadvertently leave out other financial institutions, the
statutory definition of covered entity could include a catch-all category of
firms whose business activities are "predominantly financial" in nature-a
familiar technique in U.S. laws governing financial institutions. 4 The
statute could even simply define covered entity as any entity engaged in
financial or "predominantly financial" in nature activities, without a
reference to its regulatory status.
The main virtue of a broad definition of covered entity is its relative
simplicity and the lower likelihood of leaving significant jurisdictional gaps
in the regime. Its main drawbacks, however, are potential overinclusiveness
and difficulty of administering in practice. The broader the jurisdictional
scope of the SGS regime, and the greater the number and variety of firms
subject to it, the more resource-intensive its practical implementation and
enforcement are likely to be. To avoid potential inefficiencies of this kind,
it will be necessary to supplement the general definition with a carefully
crafted list of statutory exemptions. In effect, opting in favor of a broad
default category of covered entity will push difficult line-drawing decisions
into the exemption-drafting exercise.
For a more targeted application of the proposed regime, Congress may
start with a narrowly drawn base definition of covered entity. For example,
the new regime could be explicitly limited only to SIFIs. The statute could
either (1) enumerate the criteria for determining systemic significance of
any financial firm for the purposes of the SGS regime, or (2) incorporate by
reference a particular definition of the concept under some existing law or
regulation. Congress could also delegate the power to designate individual
entities as systemically significant for the purposes of the statute to the
regulators.7 5

74. Financial laws and regulations often define the universe of firms subject to a particular set of
rules by focusing on the nature of their primary business as financial service providers. There are
various formulations of the nature-of-activities requirement ("substantially" financial, "predominantly"
financial, etc.) and the specific criteria for determining whether a firm meets it. Typically, the rules
focus on the composition of the company's total consolidated assets, revenues, and income. See, e.g., 12

U.S.C. § 5311(a) (2012).
75. Under the Dodd-Frank regime, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has the
authority to designate a nonbank financial institution as a SIFI, which would make FSOC the natural
candidate for the same task with respect to the SGS regime. See, e.g., Authority to Require Supervision

and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637, 21,637-62 (Apr. 11,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
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The main benefit of this approach is that it would allow the government
to concentrate its efforts only on firms determined to pose real risks to
systemic stability. To the extent that going this definitional route will likely
lower both the number of covered entities and the degree of variety among
their business and risk profiles, it should render the new regime potentially
easier to implement and administer. At the same time, however, the
practical efficacy of a SGS scheme targeting specifically SIFIs will
ultimately depend on the accuracy of that notoriously difficult judgment. 76
More generally, potential underinclusiveness is the principal drawback of
this approach. To counter that danger, the statute may have to allow for
some form of regulatory discretion to expand the universe of covered
entities beyond the narrowly defined base category.
Regardless of the chosen definitional approach, the statute should
specify how it would treat large, diversified financial conglomerates
combining numerous regulated financial intermediaries within a complex
holding company structure. For the proposed regime to have any real
systemic effect, it is critical that the government hold the golden share, or
SGS, in the top-level holding company, where all strategic group-wide
decisions are typically made and all group-wide data are aggregated and
assessed. To avoid unnecessary duplication, it may make sense not to hold
golden shares in subsidiaries of the same holding company. This approach
may also be preferable as a scope-limiting device because it is based on
organizational criteria rather than the qualitatively complex SIFI
determination. If this approach is taken, however, it would be necessary to
draft the statute and implementing regulations to preclude entity arbitrage
designed to shift strategic information-gathering and decision-making
functions into corporate layers below the top parent company.
2. SGS and SGS Holder
Technically, terms like SGS and SGS Holder can be defined simply by
reference to the exclusive rights associated with that instrument, as set forth
in the core substantive provisions of the statute. In that sense, these
statutory terms are fundamentally derivative concepts that can be

&

76. To date, FSOC has made only a few such official determinations, and MetLife, Inc.'s lawsuit
against FSOC underscores how deeply politicized this process can be. See Andrew M. Harris
Katherine Chiglinsky, MetLife Judge Called FSOC Review Process 'Fatally Flawed,' BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-07/metlife-judge-found-fault-with-

fsoc-too-big-to-fail-review.
77. This raises an additional question of which government instrumentality should be authorized
to exercise such discretion: FSOC, the SGS Holder, or some other regulatory body. For a discussion of
this and other issues of regime administration, see infra Part IV.
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understood only through an examination of how the SGS mechanism is
intended to function.78
The core substantive element of the proposed SGS regime is the
statutory delineation of the specific rights and obligations of the holder of
the golden share, or SGS. Because SGS is a federally created instrument,
its terms do not have to comply with the requirements of state corporate
law, and its holder's rights and obligations can be vastly different from
those of a regular corporate shareholder. At the same time, however, the
proposed regime does not seek to convert any firm into a nationalized staterun enterprise. Therefore, the greatest challenge in designing the SGS is to
find a proper balance of public and private interests within the context of a
functioning economic enterprise.
In principle, the SGS is envisioned here as a dynamic mechanism, a
sliding scale of management-and, under some circumstances, possibly
some economic-rights triggered by specified events. The SGS should be
viewed as a form of conditional (as opposed to absolute), temporary (as
opposed to permanent), and calibrated (as opposed to uniformly
predetermined) government control over the relevant covered entity's
internal governance. To appreciate in full these essential attributes of the
SGS regime, it is helpful to examine potential mechanics of its operation in
each of its two principal modes: the passive "peacetime" mode and the
active "emergency" mode.
C. The SGS Mechanism: The Passive Mode
Unlike conventional shareholders, the SGS Holder would not have to
make a capital contribution in exchange for its golden share and, generally,
would not receive any dividends or distributions. The SGS can have a
nominal value of $1.00, at which it would be carried on the covered entity's
balance sheet. Except as may be provided in the enabling statute, this
nominally valued instrument would not entitle the government to any
economic rights of a conventional shareholder, such as the right to receive
dividends or distributions. This important feature distinguishes the
proposed SGS mechanism from the more familiar instances of government
acquiring control through purchase of a majority equity stake in a firm.
Structuring the SGS as primarily, if not exclusively, a control instrument
underscores its quasi-regulatory nature and highlights the government's
role as a collective actor seeking to resolve certain market dysfunctions, as
opposed to seeking pecuniary gains. However, if the government later

78.

A related but more complex issue of which specific government instrumentality will act as

the SGS Holder with respect to all covered entities is discussed infra Part IV.A.
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deems necessary to contribute capital to a covered entity, it could receive
statutorily specified economic rights.79
Unless and until one or more of the specified triggering events happen,
the SGS is meant to remain largely a passive instrument. In this "normal"
period of dormancy, the SGS Holder would not be expected or entitled to
exercise any direct management rights in the firm. Its rights would be
primarily informational and representational in nature. It is crucial,
however, that the SGS give its holder a broad right of direct and timely
access to the firm's internal information.
This, of course, raises the issue of balancing private firms' right to
preserve, within reasonable limits, confidentiality of their business
information against the government's right to know what it needs to know
to protect the public from financial harm. Finding a workable balance of
these two interests is by no means a simple task, but it may not be quite as
difficult as financial institutions would like us to think. Financial
institutions zealously guard their "proprietary" information, partly because
they fear that competitors would copy or otherwise thwart their trading or
investment strategies, and partly because opacity and complexity of their
"branded" financial products effectively allow these institutions to extract
monopoly rents.80 However, the public interest here is compelling enough
to be given a greater weight vis-i-vis this competitive obsession with
secrecy. The private firms' interest, while subordinated in principle to the
public interest, can be reasonably protected through carefully designed
procedural mechanisms limiting the SGS Holder's ability to use or disclose
particularly sensitive trade information to other market participants. Thus,
financial regulators routinely collect and review confidential firm
information, and financial institutions themselves are routinely managing
various internal informational walls mandated by regulation. The
accumulated private and public arsenal of information-management
techniques is a good starting point for crafting procedural confidentialityprotection rules under the SGS regime.
To perform its key informational and representational roles, the SGS
Holder must have permanent representation on the covered entity's board
of directors. The enabling statute will need to mandate such permanent
representation and then delineate the rights and duties of special SGS-

79. For potential methods of calculating the government's economic interest in such cases, see,
for example, Jeffrey Maims, Building Better Bailouts: The Casefor a Long-Term Investment Approach,

63 FLA. L. REv. 1349, 1383-97 (2011).
80.

For an explanation of this phenomenon of "strategic complexity," see Awrey, supranote 71,

at 262-67 (2012); Omarova, supranote 71, at 68-75.
81. It is also subject to doubt how much "trade secrecy" there really is in the markets for
financial products, especially given the constant cross-pollination of financial institutions' personnel
and clientele.
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appointed directors (SGS directors), in line with the overarching objectives
of the SGS regime.
A few basic considerations are worth emphasizing here.
The statutory notion of an SGS director is fundamentally different from
the familiar corporate law device of an "independent" director. Independent
directors are private parties appointed by shareholders and afforded a
special place in the traditional corporate governance structure because of
their presumed neutrality and objectivity, primarily inferred from their lack
of direct financial interest in the firm. State and federal laws often mandate
a specific number of such presumably more reliable independent directors
to be appointed to boards or to specific board committees.82 Yet, it is not
entirely clear to what extent the appointment of independent directors
improves the dynamics and outcomes of corporate decision-making in
practice.8 3 Ultimately, independent directors still owe a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its shareholders and are subject to the same standards
of care and loyalty as insider directors. 84
By contrast, SGS directors are representatives of the U.S. government
(and employees of the federal entity that acts as the SGS Holder). The
statute would specify that their primary fiduciary duties run explicitly to the
taxpaying American public. The specific number of individual SGS
directors to be appointed in any particular case would depend on the
individual profile, size, and other relevant circumstances of each covered
entity. The statutory goal here is not to have a majority-or even a "critical
mass"--of government-appointed directors on the board but to have a
special class of directors with special class-specific rights that, under
certain circumstances, may override purely numeric voting outcomes.
In this respect, it is critical to grant SGS directors enhanced rights to
request any additional information from the firm's management or agents,
if necessary to enable them to fulfill their duties.85 Importantly, the statute
should expressly prohibit covered entities from taking any action whose
intended or unintended effect would be to limit SGS directors' access to
information or participation in the decision-making process.
It may also be desirable to grant SGS directors certain "baseline"
special voting rights that remain in effect at all times, even when the SGS is
otherwise "dormant." As discussed above, one of the defining features of
the traditional golden share mechanism is the special supermajority voting
power that effectively allows the government shareholder to veto any
82.

See Karmel, supra note 45.

83.

Id.

84.

See supra Part I.A.

85. To the extent the SGS directors are "insiders" of the relevant firm, the firm's lawyers' duty
of confidentiality should not prevent them from providing requested information to the firm's SGS
directors. To strengthen this point, the SGS statute could include a specific provision to this effect.
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6
corporate decision involving matters of special public policy concern. In a
similar vein, the SGS statute may require the SGS directors' affirmative
approval of certain important corporate decisions that potentially have a
bearing on matters related to systemic financial stability. For example, the
SGS directors' approval could be required whenever the covered entity's
board of directors approves the management's strategic business plan or the
firm's risk management policy, approves an executive compensation
7
program, or appoints external auditors.
To ensure the SGS directors' continuous access to vital intrafirm
information and to enhance their practical ability to exercise their decisionmaking rights in a meaningful manner, it would be advisable to mandate
that the SGS directors have designated seats on the Risk Management
Committee and the Audit Committee of the relevant covered entity's board
of directors. Being a member of these particular committees is the best and
fastest way for the SGS directors to gain a deeper understanding of the
firm's business and overall risk culture. The knowledge acquired in this
process would be an invaluable asset to the SGS directors in the
performance of their statutory duties.
In short, the principal function of SGS directors is to be our collective
eyes and ears on financial institutions' boards, the embodiment of the
government-as-market-actor striving to correct private markets' potentially
88
destabilizing and socially destructive "natural" tendencies. Furthermore,
adding SGS directors to covered entities' boards is likely to have a deeply
transformational impact on these entities' key internal processes and
norms. Among other things, it is reasonable to expect that their watchful
presence and explicitly systemic perspective would significantly improve
boardroom dynamics and alter the balance of power between financial
firms' boards of directors and managers. It is difficult to overestimate the
importance of this factor for altering banks' and other SIFIs' currently
89
prevailing-and problematic-risk culture in publicly beneficial ways.
In order to deliver these intended benefits, however, the SGS regime
must introduce a sufficiently strong incentive for financial firms to take
their SGS directors seriously even when the latter are performing their
passive peacetime duties. The most powerful incentive in this respect is the
threat of triggering the SGS Holder's special rights as the firm's manager
of last resort.

See supranotes 66-70 and accompanying text.
87. It is important to build some flexibility into this framework, giving the government entity
acting as SGS Holder the necessary discretion to determine which matters are significant enough to
require SGS directors' review and pre-approval, based on a particular covered entity's business/risk
profile, systemic footprint, or any other relevant considerations.
88. See supra PartI.B.
89. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
86.
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III. THE GOLDEN SHARE IN ACTION: THE "MANAGER OF LAST RESORT"

This Part focuses on the operation of the proposed SGS regime in its
"active" mode, when certain firm-specific or systemic factors necessitate a
shift in the principal role of the SGS Holder from that of an observer to that
of an emergency manager of the covered entity.
A.

Activating SGS: TriggeringEvents

The occurrence of specified events would trigger additional special
rights of the SGS Holder. In effect, statutory "triggering" events would
activate the SGS Holder's direct management rights, shifting the entire
mechanism from its relatively passive peacetime state into the actively
participatory "high-alert" phase. While this Article does not purport to
provide a precise list of statutory triggers and corresponding SGS rights, it
is helpful to outline some of the potentially relevant considerations.
As a general matter, statutory SGS triggers should be tied to the
regime's main policy objective: preserving systemic financial stability and
preventing excessive accumulations of systemic risk in the financial sector.
Therefore, special management rights of the SGS Holder should be
activated in response to certain internal and external signals indicating a
potentially greater likelihood of increasing systemic risk or instability.
Some of the familiar regulatory and supervisory metrics-such as capital
adequacy levels, supervisory ratings, or stress test results-can serve as
proxies for triggering additional SGS rights. 90 Another category of firmspecific SGS triggers would encompass significant weaknesses or lapses in
a covered entity's legal and regulatory compliance, financial reporting, or
internal risk management-particularly if not uncovered, reported, and
preventatively corrected internally.9 1

90. Incorporating these firm-specific metrics into the SGS regime would necessitate establishing
regular channels of communication and coordination-as well as clearly delineated spheres of
jurisdictional authority-between the SGS Holder and state and federal financial regulators. See infra
Part W.A.
91.
Obvious cases of legal misconduct or regulatory violation-such as, for example,
participation in a price-rigging scheme or fraudulent accounting practices-would trigger the additional
SGS rights. Real-life examples of such instances include scandals involving LIBOR and foreign
exchange rates manipulation, as well as "robo-signing" and other illegal home-loan foreclosure
practices of large U.S. banks. Under the proposed regime, a particular firm implicated in, or subject to
investigation in connection with, any such scandal would risk immediate triggering of additional SGS
management rights. However, the SGS rights may also be triggered in response to a series of less
egregious violations that may nevertheless indicate a troublesome pattern of the management's failure
to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. An example of such a pattern is Citigroup's infamous
string of regulatory failures in 2004-2005, which led the Federal Reserve to impose a temporary
moratorium on the company's acquisitions. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in
Managerialand RegulatoryFailures,47 IND. L. REv. 69, 71 (2014).
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Another critically important, while also difficult to define with
precision, group of SGS triggers would include signs of certain troubling
trends in a particular covered entity's business strategy and overall risk
appetite. For example, in a proposed scheme, special SGS rights can be
triggered by a potentially problematic shift in a covered entity's business
and risk profile, as a result of either acquisition-driven growth or internally
driven changes in the composition or nature of its assets and liabilities.
Some of the potential indicators here may include a sudden or rapid growth
of particular asset categories in a covered entity's or its key subsidiaries'
portfolios (e.g., certain types of asset-backed securities or physical
commodities), a discernible increase in the volume or riskiness of certain
types of off-balance-sheet transactions (e.g., credit default swaps), or rising
levels or changing tenor of the company's or its key subsidiaries' liabilities
(e.g., increased reliance on borrowing in wholesale securities repurchase
markets).
Size-related metrics may be particularly useful as potential triggers.
Size remains one of the key factors determining the level of systemic
92
significance of an individual financial institution. Therefore, it would
make sense to condition the scope of the SGS Holder's systemic riskminimizing powers on the size of a covered entity, measured either in
absolute (a specific quantitative threshold) or relative terms (e.g., market
share or rate of increase in size over a certain period of time). The logic is
simple: the bigger the firm, the bigger its systemic footprint, the higher the
potential public costs of its failure-and so the greater the need to have
direct public say in its affairs. Accordingly, an absolute quantitative size
trigger should be set at the level that would automatically pick up all of the
existing large financial groups that are potentially "too big to fail" (TBTF).
SGS Holder's broader and more direct powers over the management of
TBTF firms would function, in part, as a substitute for weakened external
market discipline and, in part, as a corrective internal systemic-vision lens.
Moreover, the threat of potentially very intrusive governmental "meddling"
in large firms' internal business affairs may operate as a significant
deterrent against becoming TBTF.
In addition to firm-specific triggers, it is important to ensure that the
SGS mechanism is responsive to external signals of potentially troubling
systemic imbalances of vulnerabilities in the financial markets. Thus,
enhanced SGS rights might be triggered simultaneously across all covered
92. Thus, under the Dodd-Frank Act and implementing regulations, financial institutions with
more than $50 billion in total consolidated assets are generally presumed to be systemically important.
Nonbanking financial companies that meet this size threshold are further evaluated for systemic
significance based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative criteria. See, e.g., Authority to Require

Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637, 21,659
(Apr. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
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entities--or their relevant subset-by sudden accelerations in credit growth
across the financial system, which may indicate excessive buildup of risk
and leverage feeding a speculative asset bubble. The government could
arrest this potentially destabilizing systemic trend by exercising its special
SGS rights to either veto or slow down certain kinds of lending and
borrowing activities pursued by individual covered entities. For example, in
the context of a nascent system-wide credit bubble, the SGS Holder could
demand that individual covered entities raise more equity as a condition to
continuing their lending activities-a demand that could also be framed as
a conditional promise to refrain from exercising the SGS Holder's relevant
veto rights. This would, in effect, function as an internal governance
mechanism for so-called dynamic provisioning, or building countercyclical
capital buffers at financial firms: when the credit is plentiful and the
economy is in an expansionary mode, financial institutions would be forced
to reduce their leverage. 9 3 Building external triggers into the SGS
mechanism, therefore, would enhance its utility as an important
complement to the government's efforts to preserve systemic financial and
economic stability through regulation.
In general, defining and applying SGS triggers is a challenging and
highly context-specific exercise that requires an individualized assessment
of all relevant factors. It is, therefore, critical to allow the SGS Holder a
significant degree of discretion in deciding when exactly its special rights
should be triggered, and how exactly they should be used. Of course, this
grant of discretion must be carefully contained to ensure there is a
sufficient degree of public accountability. 9 4 The enabling statute will need
to provide both a clear normative basis for the exercise of discretion and a
robust procedural framework for making entity-specific SGS trigger
determinations.
As a normative matter, unambiguously articulating in the statute the
key policy goals that the SGS regime is designed to serve-preserving
long-term stability of the U.S. financial system and preventing potentially
destabilizing accumulation of risk in the financial sector- would go a long
way toward establishing guidelines for the exercise of discretion by the
SGS Holder. Due to the inherent difficulty of correct and timely
recognition and interpretation of market signals, it is also important to
introduce an explicitly precautionary principle into this exercise. 9 5
Although adopting a precautionary stance may result in less precise, blunter
criteria for triggering additional SGS rights, an alternative approach
93.

For a discussion of countercyclical capital buffers, see Brett H. McDonnell, Designing

Countercyclical CapitalBuffers, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 123 (2013).
94. For a discussion of some such accountability mechanisms, see infra Part IV.B.
95.

For a discussion of the role of precautionary principle in financial services regulation, see

Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophyfor FinancialStability Regulation, 45 LoY. U. CI. L.J. 173 (2013).
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advocating a tightly limited statutory definition of each SGS triggering
event-and, thus, prospectively limiting the circumstances in which the
government can exercise its full SGS rights-potentially threatens to
undermine the efficacy of the SGS mechanism.
As a procedural matter, the statute could enumerate the key factors that
the SGS Holder either "must" or "may" take into account in making its
96
determination that a specific triggering event had occurred. The statute
would also specify basic procedures for internal and external vetting of
such determinations. Internal rules would specify the timing and format of
the intra-agency process, which would presumably be initiated by the
affected firm's SGS directors and then approved, with any necessary
modifications, by a special agency committee. Externally, the statute would
specify the timing and nature of communication and coordination between
the SGS Holder and other federal regulators-including, most importantly,
FSOC and the Federal Reserve. It is critical, however, that these procedural
rules do not operate to create undesirable delays or otherwise inhibit the
SGS Holder's ability to take necessary actions.
B. The SGS Mechanism: The Active Mode
So, what are some of these special SGS rights that are triggered by
these various events? Essentially, a triggering event ends the passive or
"dormant" state of the SGS and shifts it into the active or high-alert mode,
in response to firm-specific or market-wide signals of potential increase in
the level of systemic risk. At that point, the government essentially assumes
its (temporary) new role as the manager of last resort.
In this active mode, the SGS Holder would have broad veto powers
allowing it to block any decision by a covered entity's board of directors or
shareholders. This broad statement of the SGS veto right is based on a
common sense understanding that the government should not-and,
realistically, is highly unlikely to-exercise its broad veto rights
indiscriminately. The idea behind this broad formulation is to give the
government the necessary flexibility to take whatever measures are called
for under the circumstances. To this end, the statute would grant the SGS
Holder an express right to call shareholder meetings and to propose specific
agenda items for such meetings. The statute may also grant the SGS Holder
supermajority voting power, but only with respect to matters expressly

96. This is a well-established method of providing congressional guidance to U.S. financial
regulators exercising their discretionary powers. See generally Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by
FederalFinancialRegulators, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 569 (2013).
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determined by the SGS Holder to be critically important for the
preservation of the long-term stability of the U.S. financial system. 97
As a practical matter, the SGS Holder will exercise its post-trigger
rights through the relevant firm's serving SGS director(s). The occurrence
of a statutory triggering event, in effect, transforms the primary role of an
SGS director from that of an observer, monitor, and provider of a systemic
perspective-for the most part, remaining in the background-to that of the
key decision maker. At this stage, the SGS directors would take effective
control of the board's actions. The precise extent, nature, and mechanisms
of control would depend on the nature and severity of the SGS-triggering
concerns and other relevant circumstances of each particular case.
Generally, however, the SGS directors would have a right to impose
temporary moratoria on shareholder distributions and major corporate
transactions. They would also have a right to suspend or remove any
manager or officer of the firm. The SGS directors would be empowered
to call special meetings of the board of directors and to propose specific
agenda items or resolutions, or both, for the board's vote. 99 For instance,
depending on the circumstances that triggered special SGS rights with
respect to a particular covered entity, the SGS directors could propose
board resolutions halting specific high-risk trading or investment activities,
reducing the firm's risk exposure by selling certain assets or unwinding
trading positions, revising internal policies and procedures governing
activities in question, raising more equity and reducing the firm's leverage,
suspending or replacing individual managers or executive officers, and
engaging outside counsel to advise the firm on improving its internal
regulatory compliance and risk management functions.
If these measures prove insufficient to resolve and prevent likely
recurrence of the firm's problems, the SGS directors could propose to the
board a resolution mandating sale of certain subsidiaries or segments of the
firm's business-a measure that could effectively break up a TBTF firm. If,
on the other hand, the less drastic corrective measures work, so that the
degree of systemic risk posed by the covered entity's activities is reduced
below the statutory trigger level, the SGS should revert to the pre-trigger,

97. As is the case with the determination of the occurrence of a triggering event, the statute
would have to establish certain substantive and procedural guidelines that the SGS Holder, or any of its
agents, must follow in making the required determination of "critical importance." See supra notes 9596 and accompanying text.
98. Depending on the nature or degree of egregiousness of misconduct, the SGS directors would
have the right to petition relevant regulatory authorities to consider appropriate sanctions against
individual managers or officers.
99.
Again, it may be desirable to grant the SGS directors supermajority voting power with
respect to matters expressly determined to be critically important for the preservation of long-term
stability of the U.S. financial system, as provided in the enabling statute. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
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dormant state and the SGS directors should relinquish their special
rights.1 0
To be able to discharge their newly elevated responsibilities, the SGS
directors should be authorized to make certain necessary changes in the
covered entity's internal organizational structure. That includes, for
example, reordering the chain of command within the firm so that certain
key audit, legal, risk management, compliance, or any other personnelincluding managers of trading desks and other front office operationswork directly with, and report directly to, the SGS directors or their
designated support staff.101 This "commandeering" of the firm's employees
would be easier to achieve if the SGS directors establish direct lines of
communication with certain key personnel during the pre-trigger dormant
period.102
It is important to emphasize, however, that the ultimate goal of the
proposed regime is not to put the federal government in charge of private
firms but, to the contrary, to minimize the need to trigger the SGS Holder's
special management rights in practice. An effective SGS regime should
create strong and concrete ex ante incentives for the covered entities'
shareholders, directors, and managers to act in a way that reduces, rather
than increases, the potential negative impact of their firms' business
operations on the ability of the broader financial system to support and
stimulate real economic growth. An unambiguously formulated threat of
drastically, if only temporarily, limiting these traditional corporate actors'
control over their firms' business decisions would fundamentally reshape
the context in which covered entities raise capital and make investments.
Once investors have a strong incentive to price correctly the risk of an SGS
triggering event into their valuations of a specific covered entity, it would
put continuous pressure on the management to monitor and enforce proper
internal risk tolerance limits at every level of the firm. In that sense, the
100. The statute would have to establish special procedures and basic policy guidelines for
making this necessarily context-specific determination. These special, enhanced SGS rights are not
designed to give the government permanent control over management of a private financial services
firm. The goal here is to enable the government to intervene into the affairs of a specific firm acting in a
systemically harmful way, and do so at an early stage when internal corrections can still be made and
control can be returned to its own management. To ensure that this control reversion doesn't happen
prematurely, however, the SGS Holder's decision to put the SGS "back to sleep" would have to be
supported, reasoned, and properly documented.
101. There are, of course, various questions regarding support staff for the SGS directors: who
should be hiring them and paying their salaries, how many of them should be hired, etc. These are
important but by no means critical details for present purposes.
102. It is reasonable to expect that, in performing their general monitoring duties, the SGS
directors would build close working relationships with each covered entity's audit, legal, compliance,
and risk management departments. In fact, the very presence of the SGS directors on the firm's board,
even if in a relatively passive capacity, is likely to boost the relative power and independence of the
firm's legal and regulatory compliance managers by giving them an external source of support and
often the necessary "cover" for their actions.
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SGS regime would perform the indispensable role of a "well oiled"
"shotgun . . behind the door,"'03 which is there as a reminder of the
public's power to protect its legitimate interests-and to make the abstract
notion of market discipline far more real than it currently is.'0
IV. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: KEY CONSIDERATIONS

One of the critical factors in determining potential efficacy, or even
desirability, of the proposed SGS mechanism is the identity of the SGS
Holder and its place within the overall organizational structure of the U.S.
government. How much trust we, the taxpaying American public, put into
the new golden share mechanism depends greatly on who exercises the
powers it creates-and how effective that entity is likely to be in
performing such an important and complex task.
To be effective, the new entity-the SGS Holder-would have to
satisfy several key requirements. First of all, the SGS Holder has to have
sufficient technical expertise to be able to understand and manage large
financial institutions. Secondly, it has to have a strong sense of public
mission and be able to resist all forms of "capture" by private interests.105
Finally, the SGS Holder has to be sufficiently insulated from political
influence, while also publicly accountable for its actions.
Designing a new regime that successfully meets these standards is a
challenging task, but it is neither new nor unique to this proposal. Any
attempt to establish effective public oversight of financial markets
inevitably raises these same issues. Not surprisingly, the latest crisis
reinvigorated scholarly debate on potential methods of reducing the
distortion of financial regulators' incentives as a result of undue influence
of private interests. Many proposed solutions focus on regulatory agencies
and offer ways to insulate their decision-making from direct political
interference by Congress or a presidential administration,106 to increase

103.

William 0. Douglas, Reorganization of the New York Stock Exchange (May 20,1938), in

&

DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 82 (James Allen ed., 1969).
104. On the systematic failures of "market discipline" in the absence of an effective extra-market
disciplining device, see generally Min, supranote 1.
105. Regulatory capture is a complex phenomenon that encompasses ideological, or cultural,
capture. See, e.g., James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To LIMIT IT 71 (Daniel Carpenter
David A. Moss eds., 2014) (introducing and examining the concept of "cultural capture" as a channel of
improper industry influence over financial regulators); Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC
(May 2009), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/307364/ (arguing
that the financial industry over time successfully shaped both technical and normative views of the
regulators who came to share the industry's version of a public good).
106.
See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional

Design, 89 TEx. L. REV. 15 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REv. 599 (2010).
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transparency of regulatory decision-making and agency accountability,10 7
to strengthen the agencies' internal subject-matter expertise by increasing
compensation of agency employees and creating an elite professional
culture among them,10 8 or to institutionalize "contrarian" thinking inside
regulatory agencies.109 There is, therefore, a potentially rich source of
helpful ideas to inform the search for an optimal organizational design for
the SGS regime-a task that lies beyond the scope of the current thought
experiment.
For present purposes, the focus is on a few key design issues: the
choice of organizational form of the SGS Holder; the new entity's place in
the existing regulatory architecture; the source of funding for its activities;
and potential ways of ensuring its public accountability.
A.

OrganizationalChoices; Place in the Regulatory Structure

With respect to organizational form, there are two principal options.
First, Congress may choose to vest the SGS Holder responsibilities in one
of the existing financial regulators, such as the Federal Reserve or FDIC.
This approach may be attractive as a matter of logistics or politics, since it
avoids creating a brand new agency. However, adding a specialshareholder role to the Federal Reserve's or FDIC's existing regulatory
functions could create at least an appearance of significant conflicts of
interest and potentially undermine credibility and efficacy of the SGS
regime. Moreover, each existing agency's established culture, with its own
internal peculiarities and dysfunctions, is likely to "infect" the new SGS
corps and dilute its emerging sense of mission.
Alternatively, Congress may establish either a new federal agency or a
federally chartered government corporation-or both-to act as the
exclusive SGS Holder with respect to all covered entities. The choice
107. Thus, one of the most heated postcrisis debates focused on the secretive nature of the
Federal Reserve's decision-making process. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, "Capture" in Financial
Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175
(2011).
108. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, CaptureNuances in FinancialRegulation, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 537 (2012). The issue of compensation is extremely important in designing the SGS regime. To
ensure that the new regime employs highly knowledgeable and capable individuals, they would have to
be offered salaries comparable to what they would get paid in the private sector. Purely from an
organizational-design perspective, this factor works strongly in favor of structuring the SGS Holder as a
federal government corporation rather than a regulatory agency. Among other things, specially
chartered government corporations may be (and often are) exempt from the typical budgetary controls
and statutory ceilings on employee compensation. See KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV.,
RL30365, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: AN OVERVIEW (2011); KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG.
RESEARCH. SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS (2011).
109. See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians,89 N.C. L. REV. 1629

(2011).
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between a federal agency and a government corporation has significant
consequences. The U.S. federal government has a long history of chartering
special government corporations, many of which operate under a unique set
of privileges and constraints.1 10 Potential flexibility with respect to crafting
such special privileges and constraints weighs strongly in favor of
chartering the SGS Holder as a government corporation.1 1
To enable the new entity to perform its functions successfully, it is
important to structure its relationships with other financial regulatorsincluding the Federal Reserve, FDIC, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Securities and Exchange Commission, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau-in a
carefully balanced manner. On the one hand, the SGS Holder must
maintain close working contact with the relevant regulatory and
supervisory agencies, especially to the extent such agencies are charged
with systemic, macroprudential oversight. Mutual information-sharing and
agency coordination are indispensable for the new scheme to work
effectively.11 2 In addition to regular interagency discussion meetings, it
may be desirable to ensure the SGS Holder's ability to access supervisory
information, both on a firm-specific and aggregate basis, upon request. In
particular, SGS directors should be able to participate in the process of
supervisory reviews, to the extent necessary, and have separate channels of
communication with the relevant firm's examiners.
On the other hand, however, the SGS Holder cannot become simply
another traditional regulator-the new entity must retain its distinctive

110.

See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (describing the history of

Amtrak and other government-chartered corporations). For academic analyses of the functions and
varied organizational structures of government corporations and quasi-governmental entities, see A.
Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 543 (1995); Anne

Joseph O'Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 841 (2014); Benjamin A.
Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62

ADMIN. L. REV. 1127 (2010).
111. Among other things, this option would (1) allow the SGS Holder to offer salaries in excess
of the federal-employee compensation limits and, thus, attract and retain highly qualified personnel; (2)
potentially free it from many of the formal constraints and requirements of the administrative process;

(3) give it a greater degree of insulation from direct political pressure; and (4) encourage the emergence
of a more focused and mission-oriented institutional culture. See sources cited supra note 108. The
principal downside of this option is the potential loss of, or an ambiguity with respect to, federal
immunity. To solve or preempt this problem, the SGS statute would have to include explicit provisions

shielding the SGS Holder and individual SGS directors from potentially crippling shareholder suits. For
a discussion of such provisions, see infra Part IV.B.

112. As discussed above, regular and effective information-sharing and coordination with the
regulatory and supervisory agencies are particularly important in facilitating the SGS Holder's
determination of whether a statutory triggering event has occurred with respect to a particular covered
entity. See supra Part III.A.
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market-actor, firm-insider focus and identity." 3 The SGS Holder's most
significant decisions should reflect its primary mission to act as a direct
stakeholder in a private firm, using internal levers of corporate governance
to achieve the public goal of correcting individual firms' potentially
systemically destabilizing behavior. Even when other regulatory agencies
pursue the same general goal of preventing systemic instability, their
typical methods and general posture vis-d-vis regulated firms are
fundamentally different. The SGS Holder's decisions, while informed by
the relevant regulators' actions and opinions, must nevertheless retain their
"genetic code" as market-driven decisions, especially since the SGS
Holder's actions aim ultimately at preserving the market from selfdestruction. Otherwise, not only the legitimacy' '4 but also the very efficacy
of the SGS mechanism may be compromised."'
For example, the SGS Holder's expanded role in the active post-trigger
stage may be seen as excessively overlapping with the FDIC's and other
bank regulators' rights under the existing regime of prompt corrective
action (PCA). 116 The PCA regime establishes a scale of increasingly
intrusive regulatory restrictions on the ability of the board of directors and
management of a troubled bank to take various corporate actions-e.g.,
distributing dividends to shareholders or making acquisitions-that could
hasten its bankruptcy. It functions as an early warning system that forces
regulators to adopt a quasi-managerial stance with respect to banks facing
potential failure. As discussed above, the regulatory and supervisory
metrics that trigger various PCA responses can also be used to trigger
special SGS management rights." 7 Nevertheless, the SGS regime is not a
substitute for, or a redundant replication of, the PCA scheme. Thus, the
former is potentially significantly broader in its scope, both because its
explicit goal is the preservation of systemic financial stability and because
113.

Again, this need to establish a distinctive identity of the SGS Holder as a market actor, as

opposed to a regulator or supervisor, works in favor of establishing it as a federally chartered
government corporation. See supranote 111.
114.
One of the expected criticisms of the SGS proposal could point to potential conflicts of
interest by virtue of the government acting both as a sovereign and a shareholder in financial firms.
Although frequently overstated, it is a legitimate concern that requires special attention to avoiding or
minimizing not only actual but also apparent conflicts of interest in the operation of the SGS regime.
Designing an institutional structure and providing a clear and transparent procedural framework for the
SGS Holder's decision-making are of paramount importance in this respect.

115. Generally, there is an inherent difficulty in discussing the efficacy/feasibility aspect of any
new proposal simply because, in reality, much will depend on the culture of the new agencies and
personalities of individuals who would lead them. Who these people are, how smart and honest they
are, and how seriously they take their public duties will make all the difference in making the SGS idea
succeed or fail in practice. None of that can be theorized or "proven" in the abstract. By the same token,
of course, it cannot be theoretically "proven" that the proposed regime will necessarily fail for the lack
of the right people or the right mindset.

116.
117.

See 12 U.S.C. § 18310 (2012).
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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the universe of covered entities is likely to extend beyond FDIC-insured
depository institutions.' 18 Even more importantly, the SGS Holder will
have a unique set of internal governance tools at its disposal, potentially
enabling it to target the individual firms' problems more effectively, in a
flexible and timely fashion. In effect, a well-functioning SGS regime may
reduce the need to use the more intrusive among the PCA tools-and
possibly to place troubled firms in resolution-by shifting the burden of
timely risk prevention and correction back on the relevant firm's directors
and managers whose actions (or inactions) allowed such risk creation in the
first place.1 19 Of course, regular and close information-sharing and
coordination between the SGS Holder and FDIC are crucial to ensuring that
these two parallel processes operate in a mutually enhancing, rather than
inefficiently duplicative, way: one working from within, and the other from
outside the troubled firm.
Furthermore, in contrast to PCA or other traditional tools of bank
supervision, the SGS regime would be uniquely designed to utilize
mechanisms of internal corporate governance in response to the early signs
of systemic risk accumulation on a macro, as opposed to micro, level.
Thus, as discussed above, the SGS special management rights can be
activated if the SGS Holder identifies potentially destabilizing market or
industry trends, even if there are no immediate signs of weakness at the
level of an individual covered entity. 12 0 This type of proactive correction of
systemic imbalances through adjustments to individual firms' behavior
would serve as an invaluable supplement to the government's current
inventory of macroprudential regulation.
To take full advantage of this vital benefit of the proposed SGS regime,
it would be necessary to ensure that the SGS Holder maintains constant
communication and works closely with both FSOC and the Office of
Financial Research (OFR) of the U.S. Treasury Department.121 To the
See supraPart II.B.
119. The same potential benefit also obtains with respect to the postcrisis SIFI resolution regime
under the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA). See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
118.

Protection Act

§§

201-217, 12 U.S.C.

§§

4403, 5381-5394 (2012), 18 U.S.C.

§ 1032

(2012).

Discussing the controversies surrounding the practical implementation and potential efficacy of SIFI
resolution under the Dodd-Frank regime is beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth emphasizing
here, though, that the SGS regime potentially provides a much more flexible, broader in scope, and far
less procedurally cumbersome alternative to SIFI resolution or liquidation. In that sense, it is likely to
be a more effective potential means of avoiding politically unpopular bailouts of large financial
institutions.
120. See supra Part III.A. An example of a potentially troublesome market trend would be a
sudden rise in the price of a particular type of financial instrument, such as mortgage-backed securities.
An example of a potentially troublesome industry trend would be a sudden or rapid growth in assets or
leverage of a specific category of financial institution, such as mortgage lenders.
121. Under the Dodd-Frank regime, the OFR's mission is to provide research and informational
support for FSOC and other financial regulators specifically for purposes of detecting, measuring, and
monitoring systemic risk. See About the OFR, OFF. OF FIN. RES., www.financialresearch.gov/about/.
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extent that neither FSOC nor OFR have actual supervisory responsibilities,
their relationship with the SGS Holder would be explicitly focused on
tracking and analyzing key system-wide dynamics. The head of the SGS
Holder should have a place on FSOC, even if in a special capacity as an
observing member (in order to preserve the SGS Holder's autonomy and
identity as a market actor). The SGS directors may be explicitly allowed to
solicit information and advice from the OFR personnel and to give such
information or advice a significant weight in making their firm-specific
decisions. It may also be desirable to establish regular OFR briefings for
the entire corps of SGS directors.
B. Funding;Accountability Mechanisms
Proper funding is another important factor in ensuring the level of
operational and decision-making autonomy vital to the efficient functioning
of the new SGS regime. To perform its hybrid role as a public market actor
effectively, the SGS Holder would need to attract and retain highly
qualified and committed personnel, which requires not only sufficiently
high levels of compensation but also considerable ongoing investment in
employee training and organization building. Since the proposed SGS
regime is not designed to generate any financial profit for the federal
government, it would be critical to secure a reliable source of funding other
than discretionary congressional appropriations.
In principle, the SGS Holder could be funded by earmarking a portion
of the Federal Reserve's revenues. Another potential source of the SGS
Holder's funding could be some sort of an industry surcharge, applicable
either to all financial services firms (on a sliding scale, depending on the
firms' size or systemic significance) or to some subset of such firms. 12 2 A
though
popular,
tax" 123 -a
transactions
"financial
market-wide
controversial, idea-could also be used to fund the SGS Holder's
operations, at least in part. Finally, the function of an SGS Holder could be
vested in a public instrumentality-which could be a federal agency or a
government corporation-that performs other market-actor roles as well
and, as a result of such additional operations, generates its own revenues.124
The uniquely hybrid nature of the SGS regime also raises potentially
complex issues of designing effective procedural tools for ensuring a
reasonable degree of transparency and public accountability-while, at the
122.

This subset could include, for example, all federally insured institutions, all BHCs, and all

nonbank institutions that either exceed a certain size threshold or meet other regulatory criteria for
potential systemic significance.
123. See Ross P. Buckley, Reconceptualizing the Regulation of Global Finance, 36 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STuD. 242 (2016).
124. See Public Actors, supra note 13, at 173.
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same time, preserving the SGS Holder's ability to react quickly and to take
a wide range of actions shielded from public view by the corporate entity's
organizational walls. In devising such tools for the SGS regime, one may
be able to draw on a variety of existing examples, both in financial
regulation and in other regulatory areas. Thus, as discussed above, building
into the SGS regime a series of mandatory interagency coordination
requirements would provide an important channel for the external vetting
of the SGS Holder's most significant firm-specific determinations.125 I
addition, it may be desirable to establish some form of oversight of the
SGS Holder's operations by FSOC, as the principal U.S. systemic-risk
monitor. To avoid potentially excessive interference in the substance of the
SGS Holder's decision-making process, however, it may be advisable to
limit FSOC's oversight authority to certain procedural matters.
Furthermore, the statute could mandate that the head of the SGS Holder
submit annual reports to Congress outlining its principal actions in the
relevant period and providing its overall assessment of key trends in the
U.S. financial system.1 2 6 The statute could also require periodic audits of
the SGS Holder by an audit panel specially appointed for that purpose by
FSOC. Finally, it may be desirable to establish a special advisory body
comprising independent experts and public interest advocates, whose
primary function would be to guard not only against potential abuses of the
SGS Holder's statutory powers but also-and very importantly-against
potential failures on the part of that entity to fulfil its statutory mandate. 127
An important aspect of accountability, both in the realm of government
decision-making and in the traditionally private sphere of corporate
governance, is the availability of judicial review of decision makers'
actions. In the context of the SGS proposal advanced here, one of the most
delicate issues concerns the relative rights of private shareholders in
covered entities vis-i-vis the SGS Holder. A similar issue arose in the
context of the federal government's acquiring direct ownership stakes in
firms that received emergency equity investments under the Troubled Asset
Repurchase Program initiated by the U.S. Treasury in the fall of 2008.128
This crisis-driven measure raised difficult questions regarding the
availability of judicial and administrative review of the government's
actions in its new capacity as a controlling shareholder. Predictably,

m.

125.

See supra Part

126.

The statute may also require the SGS Holder to submit copies of its annual congressional

reports to the FSOC, Federal Reserve, and the Treasury Department.

127.

For more on designing an independent public advisory body of this type, see Saule T.

Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats,and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in FinancialServices Regulation,

37 J. CORP. L. 621 (2012).
128. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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corporate law scholars stressed the importance of protecting private
shareholders against the govermnent-shareholder's politically driven
actions that could negatively affect the corporation's profitability and
possibly the value of their individual investments. 12 9 Yet, existing corporate
statutes-traditionally, the area of state jurisdiction-are not drafted with a
sovereign shareholder in mind and, therefore, fail to provide a workable
solution. 13 0 Administrative law, which operates on an assumption that
federal government agencies make rules and administer laws rather than act
as direct stakeholders in private firms, is similarly unhelpful. 13 1
To the extent that the SGS proposal vests potentially significant levels
of control over corporate decisions in the hands of SGS directors, it
similarly transcends the doctrinal boundaries of both corporate and
administrative law. While filling this gap in the existing system of laws is
not a part of the present project, it is nevertheless possible to articulate the
basic approach to designing a working system of judicial review of SGS
decisions.
As a general matter, the SGS statute has to balance two goals: (1)
shielding the SGS Holder from lawsuits brought against it by private
parties, and (2) giving private shareholders reasonable protection against
excessive harm caused by the SGS Holder's actions. However, because
protecting the SGS Holder from incapacitating litigation battles is a vital
prerequisite for effective operation of the SGS regime, the statute should
explicitly and unambiguously prioritize the first objective over the second
one. 132
129.

See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling

Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (2011); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes
Corporate Theory and Practice,27 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010); see also Barbara Black, The U.S. as
"Reluctant Shareholder":Government, Business and the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561, 593
(2010); Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in Banks: Creeping Nationalization or Prudent,

Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 409 (2009); Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation
by Deal: The Government's Response to the FinancialCrisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009).
130.
For insightful discussions of the doctrinal and practical limitations of corporate law in

dealing with a sovereign shareholder, see Steven M. Davidoff, Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal
Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1733 (2011), Steven
Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the Financial Crisis

Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2015), and Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government is
the Controlling Shareholder:Implicationsfor Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409 (2010).
131. See Solomon & Zaring, supra note 130.
132. Ordinarily, federal government instrumentalities are protected from private lawsuits by the

doctrine of sovereign immunity. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United
States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued ....

). However, if the SGS

Holder is set up as a federally chartered government corporation, it may not be entitled to assert
sovereign immunity as an impenetrable shield against shareholder suits. See supra notes 110-111 and
accompanying text. In any event, depriving shareholders of covered entities of all access to courts may

be counterproductive and harm the regime's overall legitimacy. Finally, it may be difficult to claim full
sovereign immunity in the context in which a federal instrumentality acts in the capacity of a market
participant, rather than in its traditional regulatory capacity. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518

U.S. 839, 887-88 (1996). A full discussion of these complex and highly technical issues of legal
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For example, the statute may give the holders of common stock in a
covered entity the right to sue the SGS Holder for damages incurred by
such holders as a direct result of the SGS Holder's actions. This right,
however, should be subject to strict limitations. Thus, only holders of
common stock above a specified statutory threshold (expressed as a
percentage of the firm's total common stock outstanding at the time of
filing the lawsuit), who were common stockholders of that same firm for a
specified minimum period of time (e.g., one year of continuous ownership),
would have standing to sue the SGS Holder under the statute. These
conditions would eliminate strategic acquisitions by various arbitrageurs of
token amounts of common stock in covered entities with a view to suing
the government.
Furthermore, the SGS Holder would be held liable under the statute
only for actions taken in bad faith, with a specific intent to cause the
plaintiff direct harm that, at the time of the SGS action, was clearly
foreseeable, highly probable, and sufficiently precisely quantifiable. The
shareholder plaintiff must bear the initial burden of proving bad faith,
specific intent, high probability of the quantifiable direct harm to the
plaintiff known or susceptible to proof at the time of the SGS Holder's
action, and all other elements required by the statute. Setting this kind of a
high standard for the plaintiff will help to protect shareholders from
egregious abuses of the SGS Holder's statutory powers, while at the same
time preventing a potential onslaught of frivolous private lawsuits against
the SGS Holder.
It is worth noting here that shareholder lawsuits against the SGS
Holder are also likely to claim some form of an uncompensated
governmental taking of their property in violation of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' 3 3 In essence, these
shareholders would argue that, by taking effective control over key
corporate decisions that affected the firm's ability to generate greater
profits and thus increase shareholder value, the SGS Holder deprived the
firm's shareholders of their property rights. Controlling shareholders could
also assert the uncompensated taking of their so-called control premium, a
concept familiar to scholars and practitioners of corporate law. Under the
proposed statutory scheme, however, such claims would be unlikely to
succeed, especially because they would be fundamentally analogous to

doctrine and practice is beyond the scope of what is necessary at this point in the proposed thought
experiment. The key for present purposes is that statutory assertion of full sovereign immunity on the
part of the SGS Holder and its agents may not be a viable, or desirable, choice.

133.

There is a large body of caselaw and academic analysis of the Takings Clause, discussion of

which is beyond the scope of this Article. For a summary of the U.S. Supreme Court precedent, see
ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., 97-122, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
A CHRONOLOGY (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-122.pdf.
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"regulatory takings" claims. In general, it is difficult for private plaintiffs to
prevail on regulatory takings claims because every regulatory action
13 4
In the
inherently diminishes the value of private property subject to it.
corporate
of
assumption
temporary
Holder's
SGS
the
SGS context,
management rights is designed to curb systemically risky behavior of
financial institutions that some shareholders would say could have
generated extra profits for them. To the extent the SGS statute explicitly
and clearly articulates its public policy objectives, it should preempt such
arguments.
C. Dealing with the FearFactor
A discussion of the design and operative features of the SGS regime
would be incomplete without addressing, briefly but explicitly, the single
most important challenge this proposal is bound to face: potentially deepseated resistance to this type of bold institutional experimentation.
Some of that resistance will inevitably represent a conscious-and
consciously concealed-effort by those who benefit, directly or indirectly,
from the current state of affairs to preserve the status quo and to prevent
any reforms that threaten it. Because of the fundamentally self-interested
character of their objections, these critics are not likely to engage in a
substantive discussion on the merits of the proposal. Their fear is that the
proposed scheme could actually work as intended.
On the other hand, some of the likely skepticism toward the concept of
a special golden share regime may come from those who are genuinely
interested in finding workable mechanisms of systemic risk prevention.
These critics may raise questions about specific legal and administrative
details insufficiently developed in the outlined proposal or may worry
about its various unintended consequences.
Some of these questions and concerns may reflect the inherent
difficulty of mentally reconciling the proposed shift in the paradigm of
bank governance with some of the basic assumptions built into today's
corporate governance orthodoxy. One such familiar assumption is that
allowing the government inside the boardroom would effectively amount to
"nationalization" of private enterprise and imposition of "socialism," which
is fundamentally incompatible with America's "free-market economy" and
35
commitment to "capitalism."l This starkly dichotomous view of the world
is, of course, empirically false: the government is the crucial actor within
the modern free-market economy; its actions fundamentally enable and
134. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
135. See Templin, supra note 110.
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often constitute the very markets we call "private."136 In that sense, the
proposed SGS regime is neither "socialist" nor "capitalist." It is pragmatic
and incremental: it seeks to improve the operation and efficiency of the
hybrid public-private market economy we already have.
The best way to dispel the fear of change induced by the ossified
ideological vocabulary is to look past rhetorical labels and to assess the
proposed regime on its merits. As discussed above, the SGS mechanism is
designed to introduce the necessary systemic corrective into an inherently
entity-centric perspective of individual firms' boards. It is meant to operate
as a dynamic and flexible tool for preventing or minimizing collective
economic harms from individual firms' actions. A well-functioning SGS
regime should guide, rather than commandeer, individual banks' and SIFIs'
internal decision-making in a way that helps to smooth seemingly
unavoidable boom-and-bust cycles in financial markets-and to avoid the
need for the government to use its "manager of last resort" powers in
practice. 137
Understanding the SGS proposal in these functional, rather than
ideological, terms should also help to alleviate some of the more specific
potential concerns about its consequences for the economic viability of
financial firms. For example, it may very well be that the covered entities'
cost of capital might rise significantly, as private investors would either
refuse to buy their shares or buy them at a deep discount. To the extent this
type of market reaction reflects the generalized fear of a de facto
"nationalization," discussed above, it is likely to be both temporary and
susceptible to correction. To the extent it reflects the degree of
internalization of systemic risk posed by individual financial institutions,
however, this change in their cost of capital should be seen as an
efficiency-enhancing market adjustment. Whether or not such correction
proves fatal to the entire banking sector is a question that cannot be
answered in the abstract, though it seems unlikely that things would ever
get so bad.138 Speculative predictions aside, there is a strong argument that
making bank managers focus on safeguarding the stability of the financial
136.

For an in-depth analysis of the role of public instrumentalities in constituting and

augmenting financial markets, see Public Actors, supra note 13, and The Finance Franchise,supra note
53. See also MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE

SECTOR MYTHS (PublicAffairs 2015); Fred Block, Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a
Hidden DevelopmentalState in the UnitedStates, 36 POL. & SOC'Y 169 (2008).
137. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
138. There is another, somewhat related, concern that triggering active SGS rights with respect
to a single SIFI could lead to a massive creditor and investor "run" on that SIFI and potentially trigger a
systemic financial crisis. Essentially the same issue was widely debated in connection with the
regulatory attempts worldwide to mandate the issuance by banks of contingent debt claims susceptible
to bail-in under certain conditions. See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 125 (2012) (discussing the pros and cons of contingent convertible capital
instruments as a systemic risk prevention tool).
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system should, in fact, increase banks' and other financial institutions'
long-term value to investors. 13 9
This is not to suggest, of course, that the SGS scheme is guaranteed to
work perfectly in practice. No such guarantees can ever be given. It would
be unrealistic, however, to attempt to discuss in a single article all of the
potential consequences-intended or unintended, positive or negative-of
the proposed regime. A full understanding of such consequences is likely to
emerge only in the process of further refining and implementing the broad
conceptual framework elaborated above.
CONCLUSION

This Article outlined principal contours of a new, and very
unconventional by today's standards, regime of bank governance, in which
the task of representing the public interest on individual banks' boards of
directors is performed by a special federal instrumentality, the SGS Holder.
The proposal advanced here is more of a thought experiment than a
legislative blueprint. Developing such a blueprint would require thinking
through and resolving many complex legal, economic, and administrative
issues that are bound to arise in connection with such a bold departure from
the current norm. Moreover, there may not be sufficient political will to
pursue decisive measures of this kind, at least in the near future. And the
financial services industry will relentlessly lobby against any reform likely
to reduce Wall Street's profits by restricting its ability to externalize risk.
For all these depressingly familiar reasons, the proposed regime may be
simply too difficult to implement in practice.
Yet, it would be short-sighted to reject or dismiss this thought
experiment too quickly. The golden share regime may prove to be more
plausible than the critics are willing to acknowledge. Our current
perceptions of how impossibly difficult it would be to implement the
proposed SGS scheme may be significantly exaggerated, in large part
because that proposal represents such a radical departure from what we've
been conditioned to view as the "normal" state of play. Shifting our
collective attitudinal and conceptual framework to accommodate the basic
concept of the public as a legitimate endogenous corporate actor, on the
other hand, is bound to broaden the universe of potential legal and
administrative solutions to problems that might have previously seemed
intractable. From that perspective, operationalizing the golden share regime
envisioned here may be just the right challenge for the truly creative and
ambitious lawyers and lawmakers.
139.

For a discussion of the interplay between systemic stability and shareholder value, see

Armour & Gordon, supranote 46.
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For now, however, the task is to begin articulating the basic notion of a
hybrid public-private bank governance regime as an option on the menu of
potential reforms. Thinking along these unorthodox lines could hold the
key to unlocking the full potential of corporate governance, more generally,
as a tool of public interest. The alternative is clear: if our existing system of
corporate governance is simply too rigidly programmed to prioritize and
safeguard short-term economic interests of certain private parties, then we
must stop pretending that it can offer meaningful long-term solutions to our
most pressing public policy problems. We will then have to search for such
solutions elsewhere.

